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Abstract
We use data from the 24-hours Belluno run which has the unique char-
acteristic that participants are aliated with teams and run for an
hour. This allows us not only to study the individual relationship be-
tween age and performance but also to study group dynamics in terms
of accessions to and separations from teams in a manner that closely
resembles workers and rms when individual productivity would have
been perfectly observable. From our analysis we conclude that individ-
ual performance goes down with age, although the speed-age gradient
is rather at. Group performance goes down with age as well, but
interestingly a counterbalancing force emerges, namely team dynamics
that are driven by performance of runners who enter and leave.
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11 Introduction
Sports data have been used in economics for a wide range of purposes,
from testing the incentive to sabotage in tournaments (del Corral et al.
2010) to analyzing the extent to which players conform to mixed strategy
equilibria (Walker and Wooders, 2001). Sports data have also been exploited
in order to gather a better understanding of human behavior. They have
been extensively used to document the gender gap in competition both in
childhood (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004 and Sutter and Ruetzler, 2010) and
in adulthood (Frick, 2011). Recently, some contributions have analyzed the
role that pressure can exert on outcomes using data from professional soccer
(Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta, 2010) and hockey leagues (Kolev et al.,
2011) as well as recruiting professional basket players (Feri et al., 2011).
Sports data can be important even for the analysis of relationships in
labor economics that are hard to investigate using more traditional sources
of data. Kahn (2000) claims that a sport is a very useful laboratory that
can make much richer information available even than the Census. Sim-
ilarly, Szymanski (2003) indicates that an analysis of sports data may be
informative about labor market behavior of individuals. For instance, with
sports data it is possible to investigate the relationship between age and
productivity, which is a very interesting from a policy point of view because
of aging populations (OECD, 2006). At the level of individual workers ag-
ing is assumed to have a negative eect on productivity but it is not clear
from which age onward productivity starts to decline and it is not clear
how strong the age eect is. Firms cope with the aging of their workforce
through hirings and separations. Hiring may relate to young inexperienced
workers who recently entered the labor market or may relate to more expe-
rienced workers who quit their job or come from the pool of unemployed.
Separations may occur through layos or quits. In adjusting the workforce
monetary incentives and other extrinsic motivations play an important role.
For researchers it is dicult to study the relationship between age and per-
formance related phenomena because it is usually not possible to measure
productivity at the level of the individual worker. It is most often only at
2the level of the rm that productivity measures are available. Existing stud-
ies are inconclusive about the age-productivity gradient (see Van Ours and
Stoeldraijer (2011) for details).
In our study we analyze running data. Previous studies using this type
of sports data dier along an important dimension, because some concern
performance of professional athletes while others study amateur athletes.
Nevertheless, they all have in common that the measured performances are
mostly or entirely driven by extrinsic rather than intrinsic motivations. The
former comes from the external environment, out of the person, who acts
with the anticipation of rewards, such as monetary prizes particularly salient
in case of professional athletes, but also getting peer praise, or earning fans'
admiration. Note that competition can be seen as extrinsic motivation as
well, since the incentive to outperform the others comes from the external
environment. On the contrary, intrinsic motivation occurs when the sport
activity is enjoyable per se and a good performance constitutes a spur by
itself, without other external incentives.
We study the relationship between age and running performance using
a unique dataset, based on the 24-hour relay marathon \San Martino" held
in Belluno (Italy) in which runners perform in teams. We use data from this
marathon in the period 2002-2010. The data allow us to analyze individual
and team performance and to study the process of selective attrition. The
longitudinal data at individual level allow us to investigate the relationship
between age and running performance taking into account unobserved per-
sonal characteristics. The fact that the runners are organized in teams with
team performance as the relevant indicator makes our data truly unique. As
explained in more detail below, runners run sequentially, which implies that
the overall performance does not directly depend on the interaction between
individuals since the team outcome is simply the sum of the individual out-
comes. Moreover, there is no monetary incentive and the fact that every
participant faces a (long) xed amount of time rather than a xed distance
to run greatly weakens the role played by direct competition with the oppo-
nents. Our data allow us to study team dynamics in relation to individual
3running performance, since changes in the composition of running teams
reect how individual runners are recruited, quit or are dismissed.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, our data allow us
to measure individual level performance and to relate this to the age of
runners, thereby adding to the small volume of papers which measure the
age-productivity gradient using running data (see for example Fair (1994),
Sterken (2003), Sowell and Mounts (2005) and Van Ours (2009)). Second,
we investigate the turnover of runners between teams as well as other acces-
sions and separations in a manner that we argue to be similar to worker and
rm dynamics. Of course, the motivation of running teams are dierent from
the motivation of actual rms. Nevertheless, as with real markets also in
the Belluno marathon running teams enter and leave the arena and runners
move from one team to the other or stop running while the team contin-
ues. For instance, our data allow us to analyze how new runners perform
relatively to the average of their team, or whether runners experience up-
ward or downward mobility. A distinguishing feature of our paper is that we
study performance of individuals and teams who are almost entirely driven
by intrinsic motivations.
The set-up of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we provide details
about our data. Section 3 presents the results of our empirical analysis of
the performance of individual runners. We nd that age has a negative
eect and we nd that attrition is selective. Runners who perform bad in
a run are less likely to participate in the next run. In section 4 we study
team dynamics nding that team dynamics are very similar to \real world"
hiring and separation phenomena. Section 5 concludes.
2 The 24-hour marathon \San Martino"
The 24 hour marathon \San Martino" is a relay race that involves a number
of teams formed by 24 participants each running one hour.1 It takes place in
Belluno (Italy) every year since 1974 in the athletics track of the municipal
stadium. San Martino is the patron saint of Belluno, celebrated on the 11th
1More details (in Italian) at http://www.24oresanmartino.it/regolamento/SEZIO003/.
4of November. The relay race took place around that day in the rst editions.
Because of the usually unfavorable weather conditions in November, in the
1980s the race was moved to an earlier date and since then it takes place in
the st half of October.
The race always starts at 3 p.m. of Saturday and the changeovers take
place at every hour. Relay runners have to be in a designated space a
few minutes before their hour starts, where they wear a transponder that
automatically measures the number of laps they run. The starting point is
always at the nish zone of the 100mt. During the last 3 minutes of every
hour each runner is given a baton that must be left on the ground at the
exact point where the runner is when hearing the shot of the starter at the
changeover. Any misbehavior (running after the shot, throwing the baton,
etc.) is punished with the disqualication of the runner (the team is not
disqualied but gets zero distance for that hour). The race is won by the
team with the longest distance run by its 24 members (or less if someone
does not participate), so that the team production function is simply given
by the sum of the performances of the participants, which at least as rst
approximation excludes the existence of interaction eects among team-
mates that could aect the individual outcome.
The competition is open to males and females who are at least 16 years
old. Every runner can participate only with one team and for one hour.
Teams present a list of 24 runners (+2 reserves). There are prizes for the
best 5 teams, as well as for the best 20 male and 10 female runners, but the
monetary value is very low. For instance, the best team receives a voucher
worth 500€, the same amount paid by each team as a registration fee.
Teams are enrolled on a rst come rst served basis with a limit of 40 teams
in the last editions. Individual prizes also consist of vouchers, the value
of which ranges from 40€to 200€.2 Individual rankings beyond the best
20 males and 10 females are not published. Results are published in local
newspapers but on a hour by hour basis, so that it is almost impossible
for a reader to reconstruct the whole ranking of the marathon. At the
2Data refer to the 2011 edition.
5same time, direct competition with the opponents in the same hour can be
disregarded because after running for one hour it happens hardly ever that
two runners end up close to each other. Similarly, the competition within a
team should also not play a signicant role. In fact, although the variance of
results is lower within than across teams, it is not frequent that two team-
mates run a similar distance in such a way that the stimulus to outperform
the rst aects the performance of the second. Hence, both monetary and
non monetary external rewards are negligible, and we can safely posit that
the eort of the runners is (almost) entirely driven by intrinsic rather than
extrinsic motivations.
Our dataset covers the last nine editions of the marathon. Table 1 shows
that the size of the race increased in the period observed, with 10 more
teams (i.e. about 240 more runners) in the last editions. Such an increase
of participants has granted access to relatively slower runners, as shown by
the steadily decreasing average performance. Such nding is not mirrored
by the average individual distance of the best 3 teams that instead was
rather stable. Statistics in Table 1 have been computed on the universe
of participants (N=7446).3 The 7446 observations correspond to n=2896
individuals, 367 of whom are female and will only be included in part of our
empirical analysis. Unfortunately, the information about the year of birth
has been collected only in four editions out of nine and is available for 1633
(male) runners. When missing, the information about age can be retrieved
for the runners who also participate in some of the years in which it has
been collected, i.e. for runners who participate more than once (2610 out of
3715 observations). This implies that information is not missing at random
because the average performance is positively correlated with the number of
participations. Not surprisingly, performance is signicantly better for the
runners for whom the age is available. However, in our empirical analysis
we will always adopt xed eect specications, i.e. we analyze only the 1207
runners (4922 observations) with multiple participations, as summarized in
3This number is lower than the theoretical number (N=7464) for two reasons. First, 7
observations are really missing (runners disqualied or absent). Second, 11 observations
have been deleted because the performance was more than 50% below the average in the
other participations signalling an injury.
6Table 2. While still dierent in levels, the distribution of the performance in
rst dierences is not signicantly dierent between missing and non-missing
observations of age (Mann-Withney test, Prob> jzj=0.1885).
Table 3 shows that although attrition is signicant, many runners stay
in the sample. For instance, of the 365 participants in 2002 (some of whom
started even earlier) more than one third are still participating in 2010. The
table also includes non-consecutive participations, and this explains why
there are more runners in 2004 than in 2003 among those who participated
in 2002. In fact, 42 runners participated in 2003 but not in 2004, while 51
participated in 2004 after having skipped the 2003 edition.
Performance is roughly normally distributed (see Figure 1) over a range
between 10.3km (1st percentile) and 18.3km (99th percentile), showing a
slightly negative correlation with age (Figure 2). There is a signicant dis-
persion of the performance within teams, with runners that are going to
dropout and (to a lower extent) new runners who display a relatively worse
performance (Figure 3). As far as teams are concerned the picture is similar.
Like for individuals, we consider only teams with multiple participations.4
Also in this case there is evidence of attrition (see Table 3), while the distri-
bution of the performance is positively skewed (see Figure 4) over the range
between 281km (1st percentile) and 416km (99th percentile).
3 Individual performance
In our analysis of individual running performance we only include males. We
consider only those who participate at least twice, so that we can introduce
individual xed eects. We start our analysis by relating the speed y of
participant i in year t to his age a, and to account for non-linearities we also
include a2:
log(yit) = i + 1ait + 2a2
it + it (1)
4Moreover we drop the two observations referring to a team made only by new moms.
7where  is an error term. The relevant parameter estimates are shown in
Table 4.5 Age has a signicant nonlinear eect on running performance.
Initially, age correlates positively with running speed, but after age 34 the
performance starts to decline faster and faster. The speed-age gradient is
+0.15% at age 30, -0.17% at age 40, -0.49% at age 50 and -0.81% at age 60.
To check whether or not our data suer from selective attrition we add
participation in the next run as an additional explanatory variable, but
we want to distinguish between a voluntary choice to quit from a possibly
exogenous shock. For this reason, we dene Si;t+1 = 1 the event that the
team stops, while we dene si;t+1 = 1jSi;t+1 = 0 the event that the runner
drops out once and for all voluntarily, i.e. when the team continues. A
negative and signicant coecient of si;t+1 = 1 would be evidence of selective
attrition (see Wooldridge (2002), page 581). The parameter estimates shown
in Table 4 indicate that selective attrition is indeed a problem. Future
dropout has a negative eect on the running speed in the current year, or in
other words that fast runners are more likely to survive. Other things being
equal, the 17% of observations that refer to individuals who stop running
display an average speed that is lower, though only by 0.82%. Also shown
in Table 4 is the coecient of Si;t+1 = 1 that is not signicantly dierent
from zero. This is evidence supporting that team closure is an exogenous
phenomenon at least from the point of view of the individual runner.
Our main conclusion is that age has a negative eect on running speed
for runners in their mid thirties and older, with a drop in running speed
that increases with age. Although the magnitude of the dierence is not
big, there is evidence of selective attrition and therefore the estimated drop
in running speed due to age should be considered a lower bound.
Our results are consistent with the evidence in the literature. Fair (1994)
studies U.S. data on men's running records nding that the age related phys-
ical deterioration is rather low. For example between age 35 and 55 the time
needed to run the half marathon increases annually by 0.8%, while between
5Note that in Table 4 the number of observations is lower than 4922 because we exclude
627 temporary interruptions as well as 557 observations that refer to 2010 and for which
we cannot say anything about future participations.
855 and 65 the annual increase is 1.1%. This means for example that a run-
ner aged 65 only needs 30% more time to run the half marathon than a
runner aged 35. In the age range 40 to 70 annual deterioration rates for
sprint - 100, 200 and 400 meter track - are 0.6%, for longer distances 0.8%,
for men 100 meter swimming 0.5%. Although at higher ages the deteri-
oration rates increase, for a fairly wide age range productivity losses are
quite small. Sterken (2003) uses U.S. age-dependent road-racing records
to analyze the relationship between age and running speed on various dis-
tances. He nds that even at a high age it is still possible to run fast, with
a drop in speed in line with medical studies on the impact of aging on max-
imal oxygen uptake. Sowell and Mounts (2005) use data from the Ironman
Triathlon World Championship to study the relationship between ability,
age and performance. They nd that although men achieve better than
women in absolute sense, their relative performances are similar. A man
age 65 is 44% slower than a man age 35, while for women the dierence is
48%. Van Ours (2009) analyzes the performance of participants in a Dutch
10 kilometers run (2009) nding that there is a negative eect of age on
running speed from about age 40 onwards. He nds no evidence of selective
attrition.
4 Team performance and team dynamics
4.1 Team performance
We start our empirical analysis of team performance using a similar set-up
as before, now using team averages as dependent and explanatory variables:
log(yjt) = j + t + 3ajt + wjt + ejt + "jt (2)
where yjt is the average speed of group j in year t, a is average age, w
represents the percentage of women in the group, e is the team experience
captured by the number of participations, j are team xed eects and t
9are calendar time xed eects.6 Finally, , , and  are parameters and "
is an error term. The parameter estimates are shown in Table 5.
In the rst estimate we nd a signicantly negative eect of the share
of females in a team while team performance increases with experience.
In the second estimate average age of the team is included, which has a
negative eect on team performance. Including age does not change the
eects of the share of females or team experience. In the third estimate
a quadratic age term is introduced but this has a non-signicant eect on
running performance. Introducing a quadratic age term also removes the
signicance of the linear age term. Apparently the relationship between
team performance and average age in linear.7
Returning to the rst estimate, the footnote to Table 5 shows the pa-
rameter estimates for the calendar year xed eects that capture the eect
of time varying conditions, such as the weather, but that also represent
changes in team composition that are not accounted for otherwise. A down-
ward trend is apparent even though we control for the negative eect of
the increasing average age. Although not signicant, it suggests that addi-
tional investigation is needed to conrm that the increase in the size of the
marathon allows relatively slower runners to be recruited. Notice that in
spite of this downward trend teams manage to improve their performance
by 0.8% a year, which is four time as much the decrease that should be
observed due to the ageing of the participants. Intrinsic motivations alone,
therefore, seem to be an eective device that drives team dynamics towards
better performances, more than counterbalancing the age eect even in an
environment in which slower and slower runners are recruited.
Finally, in the fourth estimate we investigate whether attrition at the
team level is important but we nd this not to be the case. The coecient of
6Note that we can distinguish between average age and calendar year as well as between
team experience and calendar year because of the group dynamics. If teams would always
have the same runners we would not be able to do this as average age and calendar year
would be perfectly correlated. The same would happen with team experience if all the
teams participate in every edition. Note also that in equation (2) we assume that average
age and team experience are exogenous to team performance.
7Note that it could be that we cannot distinguish a quadratic term from a linear one
because the range over which average age varies is limited.
10Si;t+1 is even positive although not signicant, suggesting the possibility that
faster teams are more likely to shut down. Although counterintuitive, this
is observed from time to time in our dataset. In fact, teams that participate
with some chances of winning the competition are sometimes characterized
by a `hit and run' strategy. For instance, a team with no more than 2
participations shows up in the rst three positions 8 out of 27 times, most of
which until 2005. The turnover among the top teams sharply decreases after
2005, however, with the top positions systematically reached by teams with
at least 5 participations. Overall, evidence in Table 5 conrms that teams
are not characterized by selective attrition and therefore that a decision of
a team to shut down is not driven by a poor performance of its runners.
4.2 Team dynamics
Teams greatly dier according to their degree of competitiveness, as shown
by Figure 4, as well as in the number of participations. The majority of
teams participate without chances of winning, and for this class of teams the
objective function is either non measurable (conveying a message, soliciting
charity, etc.) or totally unobservable (e.g. just fun). While at rst glance
this could cast a shadow on the importance of team dynamics in our dataset,
we have shown in Table 5 that the incentive to improve the performance
matters even though teams are driven by intrinsic motivations only. These
results call for a more detailed analysis of the dynamic of inows to and
outows from teams that we can do at the individual level thanks to the
availability of individual records of productivity in our dataset.
4.2.1 Outow from teams
We distinguish between two types of voluntary outows from teams: quits
and dropouts. In case of quits individual runners leave a team but they run
again the next year for a dierent team. Dropouts are instead runners who
stop running although their team continues. Both quits and dropouts are
individual voluntary choices, as opposed to layos who are runners hit by
11the exogenous shock of their team shutting down.8
We model individual choices using linear probability models. The rst
two columns of Table 6 shows the parameter estimates. Quits are analyzed
in levels (no xed eects) because it's the level that matters, rather than the
deviation from one's own average. The better the runner (in levels), the more
likely he should be to experience upward mobility for instance because in the
top teams more attention is paid to improving the aggregate performance.
The dropouts are instead analyzed with xed eects because in this case we
conjecture that it is the variation with respect to a reference point like one's
past performance that may trigger the decision. Our parameter estimates
show that only the rst of our conjectures is correct since faster runners are
indeed more likely to change their team, while the dierence with respect
to one's average do not aect the likelihood of dropping out.
Comparing the performance with one's team-mates help to explain out-
ow decisions in both cases. Dening the relative performance as the per-
centage dierence with respect to the average distance run by one's male
team-mates, being better than the average decreases linearly the probability
of dropping out.9
The relative performance displays a U-shaped eect on the likelihood
of quitting, which is higher both for those worse than the average in t   1,
i.e. those with a relative performance lower than zero, and for those better
than the average. However, there are dierent patterns consistent with these
results. For instance, a runner that decides to change team could be faster
than his fellows in the new team either because he is really good, or because
he left a good team to go in a worse one where he still performs better
than the average. In other words, movers can experience both upward and
downward mobility.
Table 7 analyzes upward and downward mobility, dened as the dier-
ence between the rank of the old team in t   1 minus the rank of the new
8Note that temporary interruptions are considered as dropouts in this section.
9Results are robust to including also females in the computation of the relative perfor-
mance.
12team at time t, estimating the relation:10
ranki;t = i + 4ait + 5reli;t 1 + it; (3)
where reli;t 1 is the percentage dierence of the performance of runner i as
compared to the average of the old team and  is an error term.
Results show a sizable eect of the relative performance of the runners in
shaping their mobility, with a dierence of 10% with respect to the average
of the old team being associated with an improvment of 12.6 positions in
the ladder with the new team. The bulk of the eect is due to the variance
between runners better and worse than average as well as to the variance
within those who are characterized by upward mobility. A similar correlation
is not apparent within the movers worse than the average of their teams, as
displayed in column 3. Age has no separate eect in this case.
Our results are robust to alternative specications. In fact, we do not
obtain very dierent insights once we include also the stayers in the analysis,
assigning them the change in the rank of their own team from one year to
another. This captures the idea that the strength of the same team can
change in dierent editions, or in other words that teams as a whole can
experience upward and downward mobility. The only dierence is that a
signicantly positive correlation emerges even for the runners worse than the
average, meaning that the worse the performance the bigger the decrease in
the ladder.
Summarizing, the results in this section show that the decisions to leave a
team are signicantly correlated with the absolute and relative performance
of the runners. The dynamics closely resemble what happens in the labor
market. Runners dropping out parallel the situation in which workers deci-
sion to retire is aected by a lower relative productivity. Similarly, upward
mobility of runners reminds the decision of the most productive workers to
move when oered a higher wage by another rm. The striking feature of
our results is that such dynamics are triggered by intrinsic motivations only.
10Note that a positive number stands for an improvement in the rank. The number of
observations is low because we only consider consecutive participations of runners who
voluntarily change their team.
134.2.2 Inow to teams
In this section we check whether productivity-driven dynamics are observed
also as far as the inow side is concerned. We can distinguish four types
of entrants: 1) layos, i.e. those whose old team shut down, 2) quits, who
are the same individuals as in the previous section but now we look at their
destination, 3) runners returning after a temporary interruption, and 4) new
entrants.
The third and fourth columns of Table 6 show parameter estimates for
a linear probability model of the selection from the pool of unemployed.
Clearly, better runners are more likely to nd immediately a new team after
the decision of the old team to shut down, conrming that also inows are
related to productivity.
The rst column of Table 8 instead compares the average performance
of the dierent types of runners with that of the stayers of their own team:
log(yit) = j + t + type + 6ait + 7a2
it + 8ejt + !it; (4)
where type represent xed eects for types of runners and ! is an error term.
The regression controls for any observed and unobserved feature common to
a team j or to a specic year t as well as for ejt, the experience of team j at
time t. It shows that quits and laid-o runners are on average signicantly
better than the stayers, by 1.9% and 2.3%, respectively. Returns do not
signicantly dier, while new entrants are 2.3% slower. This result is in line
with our expectations given the increase in the number of runners in recent
years that made the entrance less and less selective. At the same time the
average performance positively correlates with team experience, something
that points towards the importance of the market for runners and that is
analyzed in the next Section.
4.2.3 Balance
The rst estimate of Table 5 shows that teams improve their performance
by 0.7% a year. This is remarkable given that on the one hand the average
14performance decreases with time (see Table 1) and on the other hand that
the average age increases by more than two years between 2002 and 2010. In
fact, when controlling for the average age the annual improvement becomes
0.82%. We also know that new runners display a performance below the
average as shown in the rst column of Table 8.
The nature of the inow into and outow from teams is what allows
to reconcile these stylized facts. Team dynamics driven by productivity
must therefore be strong enough to more than counterbalance the decreasing
overall trend. In other words, the recruitment of new runners as well as the
reallocation across teams of those who continue participating must be non-
random in order to account for teams improving their performance.
The second column of Table 8 shows that indeed this is the case. This
specication decomposes the eect of team experience interacting it with
the type of runner. In other words, an interaction term between experience
and type of runner is included. We already know that new runners are on
average the slowest type. From descriptive statistics we can also see that,
not surprisingly, new teams rely more heavily on this category. Moreover,
now we also learn that new teams also hire worse new runners. In fact,
results show that the average performance of new runners increases by 1.4%
for every year of experience of the teams. This probably happens because
experienced teams are more likely to be contacted by runners searching for
a team, or more generally thanks to a better network of contacts. Simi-
larly, teams become more and more capable of selecting among their pool of
runners, given that also the average performance of the stayers signicantly
improves by 1.2% for every additional participation of a team. In contrast,
incumbent teams do not seem capable of recruiting faster runners already in
the market. While the point estimate is always positive coecients are not
signicant, also because the number of observation in these cases is quite
low.
All in all, we observe that teams exert eort clearly aimed at improving
their performance. What we nd particularly striking is that such dynam-
ics are observed in the whole sample while only very few teams have some
15chances to compete to win the marathon. As long as runners can predict
their individual performance with a reasonable precision, something that
can safely be assumed, the great majority of the teams perfectly knows in
advance that they have no chance of winning giving that the top teams have
always displayed average performances above or about 18km/h. Hence, the
eort that teams successfully exert in the market for runners towards the im-
provement of the average performance is also driven by intrinsic motivations
only.
5 Conclusions
Sports data can be informative about economic phenomena that are dicult
to study with traditional economic data. We use data from the 24-hours Bel-
luno run which has the unique characteristic that participants are aliated
with teams and run for an hour. This allows us not only to study the in-
dividual relationship between age and performance but also to study group
dynamics in terms of accessions to and separations from teams in a man-
ner that closely resembles workers and rms when individual productivity
would have been perfectly observable. Another unique feature of our dataset
is that direct nancial incentives and more generally extrinsic motivations
are to a large extent absent. Individual incentives and team allocation are
almost entirely driven by intrinsic motivations.
From our analysis we conclude that individual performance goes down
with age, although the speed-age gradient is rather at. Moreover, runners
are more likely stop racing if they under-perform relative to their team.
Group performance goes down with age as well, but interestingly a counter-
balancing force emerges, namely team dynamics driven by performance of
runners who enter and leave. In a market economy rms try to deal with an
aging workforce and keep their performance up-to-date by hirings and sep-
arations. Although there is no monetary incentive, running teams behave
like if they are on a market in which productivity is the key variable. They
have an incentive to stimulate group performance through reallocation of
runners. These adjustments through accessions and separations are strong
16enough to more than counterbalance the age eect. We also nd that the
ability of teams to recruit relatively better new runners increases with their
experience.
Although driven by intrinsic motivation, team dynamics are in line with
a system of external monetary and non-monetary rewards. Runners who do
well are more likely to quit for better teams. In case a team stops partic-
ipating, runners who do well are more likely to immediately nd another
team. Similarly, runners that do worse than the average of their team are
more likely to dropout the race. And, as in a real life labor market, age
has a negative eect on the probability to quit and a positive eect on the
probability to dropout.
All in all, our analysis shows that for individual runners as well as run-
ning teams incentives matter albeit through intrinsic motivation rather than
through monetary stimuli or other extrinsic motivation. Individual run-
ners behave as if they are workers in a rm. Teams behave as if they are
rms which deal with an aging workforce and potential productivity decline
through accessions and separations.
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18Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Fraction Distance Distance Distance
Edition N.of teams Age of females (average) (males) (best 3 teams)
2002 29 36.9 8.5% 14408.1 14570.1 17017.7
2003 29 37.7 7.5% 14414.1 14581.3 16545.7
2004 32 38.6 9.8% 14016.3 14222.6 16005.4
2005 32 38.2 10.8% 14141.3 14380.3 16550.8
2006 36 38.6 9.5% 14042.6 14232.1 16303.8
2007 34 38.7 9.2% 14094.2 14276.0 16559.2
2008 39 39.5 10.1% 14066.1 14266.6 17240.8
2009 39 39.8 12.1% 13874.7 14132.4 17332.1
2010 39 39.2 12.8% 13790.5 14046.8 16269.6
Note: Distance in meters, all participants. Two teams (one in 2007 another in 2008 dropped
because 100% female)
Table 2: Missing data
Individuals (n) Observations (N)
Female 367 800
Only one participation 1096 1096
Age missing, not inputed 226 628
Age non missing 1207 4922
(of which inputed) (2608)
Total 2896 7446
Age missing Age non missing
Distance (level) 14201.1 14408.1
Distance (1st di) -20.0 -2.2
Nr of participations 3.5 5.0
Age . 39.0
19Table 3: Attrition; individual runners and teams
Started Participated in
in 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
a. Individual runners
 2002 365 275 284 234 218 184 171 158 137 2026
2003 169 135 108 89 70 60 46 39 716
2004 150 105 98 73 65 60 50 601
2005 122 96 73 60 48 43 442
2006 111 94 64 51 60 380
2007 124 101 82 62 370
2008 75 54 74 203
2009 92 92 184
Total 365 444 569 569 612 619 596 591 557 4922
b. Teams
 2002 25 25 22 19 19 15 15 13 13 166
2003 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 0 17
2004 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 25
2005 5 5 5 4 3 3 25
2006 6 6 5 4 4 25
2007 3 3 3 2 11
2008 5 5 4 14
2009 6 6 12
Total 25 28 30 32 36 34 37 38 35 295
Note: panel a of the table includes temporary interruptions. This explains for instance why there
are more runners in 2004 than in 2003 among those who started in 2002. In fact 42 runners
participated in 2003 but not in 2004, while 51 participated in 2004 after having skipped the 2003
edition. Panel b of the table include teams with at least two participations, also considering
temporary interruptions.
20Table 4: Speed and age: Individual (log) distance
age age2 st+1 St+1
1. 1.09 (4.6)** -0.016 (5.7)** { {
2. 1.15 (4.8)** -0.016 (5.7)** -0.82 (3.0)** {
3. 1.15 (4.8)** -0.016 (5.7)** -0.84 (3.1)** -0.20 (0.8)
Note: the estimates are based on 3738 observations of 1160 individuals; individual xed eects are
included; robust standard errors; the age eects reect percentage change by year of age; absolute
t-statistics in parentheses; ** (*) = signicant at 5% (10%) level.
Table 5: Age, experience and speed: Group (log) distance
% female experience age age2 St+1
1. -0.21 (7.2)** 0.71 (1.8)* { { {
2. -0.20 (7.2)** 0.82 (2.1)** -0.23 (2.6)** { {
3. -0.20 (7.3)** 0.88 (2.2)** 0.75 (0.8) -1.28 (1.0) {
4. -0.20 (7.2)** 0.75 (1.8)* -0.22 (2.5)** { 0.46 (0.7)
Note: the estimates are based on 295 observations of 58 teams; group xed eects and calendar
year xed eects are included; in the second specication the calendar year xed eects where as
follows (2002 = base year): 2003 0.01 (0.0); 2004 -1.79 (1.8)*; 2005 -1.59 (1.2); 2006 -2.24 (1.4);
2007 -2.30 (1.2); 2008 -2.94 (1.3); 2009 -3.38 (1.3); 2010 -2.51 (0.8). All the coecients represent
percentage changes; absolute t-statistics in parentheses; ** (*) = signicant at 5% (10%) level.
21Table 6: Probability of quitting, dropping out and nding a new team when
laid o
Quit Dropout Inow from unemployment
Distance (log) .135 (2.4)** .016 (0.6) 0.396 (1.5) 0.692 (3.7)**
Relative perf. -.007 (0.9) -.062 (3.5)** 0.059 (1.8)* {
Relative perf.2 0.102 (2.2)** { { {
Age -0.082 (1.9)* 3.53 (9.2)** -0.18 (0.7) -0.18 (0.8)
Fixed eects no yes no no
R2 .005 .001 0.04 0.03
N 4365 4365 497 497
n 1209
Note: Robust standard errors; coecients reect percentage change by year of age and by 10% of
relative performance; absolute t-statistics in parentheses; ** (*) = signicant at 5% (10%) level.
Table 7: Upward and downward mobility
Dependent variable: dierence in the rank
All Above average Below average
Relative performance 12.6 (5.8)** 9.6 (3.7)** -13.4 (1.2)
Age .02 (0.0) -.43 (0.3) 2.6 (1.5)
Fixed eects yes yes yes
R2 .26 .16 .001
N 313 171 142
Note: Robust standard errors; coecients reect change in the rank by 10% of relative perfor-
mance; absolute t-statistics in parentheses; ** (*) = signicant at 5% (10%) level.
22Table 8: Team dynamics and balance
Dep var: log(distance) (1) (2)
new -2.3 (5.4) ** -2.7 (3.8) **
layo 2.2 (2.1) ** 4.8 (2.8) **
quit 1.9 (2.3) ** 3.8 (2.9) **
return .45 (1.0) 1.2 (1.2)
experience 1.2 (2.1)** {
stayer*experience { 1.2 (2.4)**
new*experience { 1.4 (2.5)**
layo*experience { 0.5 (0.7)
quit*experience { 0.7 (1.0)
return*experience { 1.1 (2.0)*
age .42 (2.8) ** .43 (2.9) **
age2 -.008 (4.5) ** -.008 (4.6) **
team xed eects yes yes




N.B. We consider only teams with multiple and consecutive participations and runners with mul-
tiple participations. Omitted type: stayer. Robust standard errors; coecients reect percentage
changes; absolute t-statistics in parentheses; ** (*) = signicant at 5% (10%) level.
23Figure 1: Frequency distribution of distance per runner
Figure 2: Boxplot of performance by age
24Figure 3: Frequency distribution of distance relative to one's team
Figure 4: Frequency distribution of distance per team
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